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China after the reform era
Carl Minzner
Carl Minzner is a professor at Fordham Law School who specializes in 
Chinese law and governance. His essay “China at the Tipping Point: 
The Turn Against Legal Reform” appeared in the January 2013 issue of 
the Journal of Democracy.
In an era of democratic decline, authoritarian rule is receiving a careful 
new look. Their fingers having been burned in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
U.S. policy makers have backed away from the democracy-promotion 
agenda identified with prior administrations. Authoritarian regimes in 
Cuba, Iran, and Burma were once scorned by Washington elites. Now 
these regimes are targets of cautious diplomatic outreach.
A new tone has entered academia as well. During the 1990s, experts 
spoke confidently about a “third wave” of democratization. Now they 
characterize the decade since 2005 as one of “democratic recession” 
and “authoritarian resurgence.”1 Even Francis Fukuyama has altered 
course. Struck by a plethora of unsuccessful democratic transitions—
in Russia, Africa, and the Middle East—he now cautions readers to 
focus less on the high-minded goal of building liberal democracy, and 
more on constructing the basic machinery of rule by an efficient state.2 
Given this, one can understand why China might seem attractive today. 
Compared with the steadily escalating turmoil in the Middle East and the 
slow-moving train wreck of Russia and Ukraine, China appears a relative 
haven. There is no revolution and no civil war. For roughly three decades, 
economic growth averaged 10 percent a year. On the surface, China seems 
the very incarnation of the efficient state machine that Fukuyama calls for. 
But a closer look at the four decades of China’s reform era reveals a differ-
ent truth. China’s heady accomplishments have been grounded in a set of 
norms and policies—political, economic, and ideological—adopted in the 
last quarter of the twentieth century. These are now unraveling.
Since 1989, Beijing has firmly adhered to one core principle: Uphold 
the rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at all costs. Naturally, 
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this has led Chinese leaders to take political liberalization off the table. 
But it has also led them to undermine the very governance reforms that 
have been key to the resilience shown by China’s authoritarian regime. 
Put simply, in their drive to retain political power, CCP leaders have 
eroded the late-twentieth-century bedrock on which China’s success has 
been built. Rather than serving as the poster child for successful authori-
tarian governance, China is actually an example of the perils of failing 
to undertake political reform.
The Birth of Reform, 1978–89
In the late 1970s, few would have deemed China a successful au-
thoritarian model. It was unstable, isolated, and poor. Socialist planning 
had rendered it an economic basket case, with a per capita income lower 
than that of Afghanistan, India, or Zaire. Decades of political radicalism 
under Mao Zedong had left China in disarray. Mao’s preference for ruling 
as supreme leader (“the great helmsman”) through mass movements de-
stabilized state and society alike. During the chaos of the Cultural Revo-
lution (1966–76), bureaucratic and legal institutions collapsed entirely. 
Universities shut their doors. Intellectuals were sent to do hard labor in 
remote rural areas. Nor was the political elite above the fray. Individual 
leaders and their families regularly rose and fell with the shifting winds 
of court politics. Serving as Mao’s heir apparent was positively hazardous 
to one’s health. The first two ended up dead, while Mao’s wife, who had 
tried to usurp power in his waning years, was arrested after Mao’s own 
death in 1976.
Deng Xiaoping’s rise to power in 1978 marked a dramatic shift. The 
searing experience of the Cultural Revolution convinced him and other 
leaders of the need for deep change. They stabilized elite politics. Unlike 
Mao, Deng never exercised one-man rule. In part, this was because CCP 
elders elevated other figures, particularly Chen Yun, to the top ranks as 
a check on Deng. But Deng’s own preferences also played a role. He 
eschewed Mao’s cult of personality, opting instead for a low-key manage-
ment style marked by a search for consensus among top leaders.
Under Deng, party governance was regularized. Mass movements 
faded. There was less stress on ideology, and more on results. In his 
famous words, “It does not matter if a cat is black or white, so long as 
it catches mice.” Merit-based systems were established to recruit and 
promote new officials. Orderly retirement procedures were adopted to 
clear out the elderly. China thus avoided the fate of the Soviet Union in 
the 1980s, where leadership ranks resembled a slowly decaying geriatric 
ward. Political purges, once so fierce, grew rarer and milder. Although 
Deng’s first two handpicked successors were forced to resign following 
outbreaks of student unrest during the late 1980s, neither was physically 
harmed, nor were their families targeted.
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The rest of the Chinese bureaucracy swung back toward institutional-
ized governance as well. No longer were the rules of the game supposed 
to shift with each new leader.3 Legal reform became a hallmark of the 
post-Mao era. Authorities issued hundreds of new statutes and regula-
tions, constructing a comprehensive framework of criminal, civil, and 
commercial law. They reopened law schools. Thousands of new gradu-
ates began to flow into the courts and other government legal bureaus 
that rose from the ashes of the Mao years.
Economically, the 1980s saw dramatic improvements in standards of 
living. Collectivized agriculture unraveled. Market incentives were intro-
duced. Rural incomes soared, lifting hundreds of millions out of crush-
ing poverty. The urban-rural gap narrowed. As Yasheng Huang points 
out, “Chinese capitalism—in the 1980s—was also a poor man’s affair.”4 
Financial liberalization led to expanded credit in the countryside. Rural 
entrepreneurship boomed as township and village enterprises grew.
Socially, China gradually opened up. Authorities backed away from 
the pervasive ideology that had characterized the Mao era. The Party 
no longer had any deep interest in controlling citizens’ internal beliefs, 
just their public actions. Churches, mosques, and temples reopened. So 
did colleges and universities. Official controls over the lives of citizens 
eroded. As ration coupons and state employment gave way to market 
forces, people became less dependent on bureaucrats. When greener 
pastures beckoned in the next county or province, many began to simply 
pick up and leave. And as China turned outward, foreign students, busi-
nesspeople, and ideas began to flow in.
By the late 1980s, such trends had culminated in an unusually open 
atmosphere. Relaxed religious policies had generated improved rela-
tions between the state and ethnic groups such as the Muslim Uighurs 
and Buddhist Tibetans, including a series of talks between representa-
tives of Beijing and the Dalai Lama. Intellectuals gathered in Beijing sa-
lons to debate liberal reform. In these years, even state television could 
air controversial programs such as River Elegy (1988), which critiqued 
traditional Chinese culture and urged greater exposure to the outside 
world as a means to modernize China.
Chinese authorities themselves began to experiment with yet deeper re-
form. Controls over the media were relaxed. And in 1987, under reform-
minded CCP general secretary Zhao Ziyang, they edged tentatively toward 
separating the Party from the organs of government—the furthest steps to-
ward meaningful political reform that China has seen to date.
Constrained Reform, 1989–2003
Then came Tiananmen. After a period of seeming indecision, the par-
ty-state came crashing down on the 1989 student democracy movement 
with savage repression. Reform experiments were cut short. Party elders 
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By 2002, CCP leaders had 
managed to turn com-
munist orthodoxy on its 
head—redefining Party 
tenets to accept self-
made billionaires into 
the CCP itself. Money 
and power thus fused 
into “red capitalism.”
sacked Zhao, purged reformists from the bureaucracy, and reinstated 
tight controls over the media and government. Horrified by the fate that 
began to overtake the communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe 
just a few months after the Tiananmen 
Square crackdown of June 1989, the 
CCP chiefs set their faces implacably 
against fundamental political reform.
With an existential crisis loom-
ing, Deng Xiaoping moved carefully. 
Viewing the politics of leadership suc-
cession as a major driver of the Soviet 
collapse, Deng eased the older genera-
tion of CCP leaders into retirement. He 
crowned his own political heir, Jiang 
Zemin (1989), and anointed Hu Jintao 
as Jiang’s eventual successor. Com-
bined with increasingly regularized 
promotion and retirement standards, this brought an unusual degree of 
stability to the Party bureaucracy for roughly two decades, lasting even 
beyond Deng’s death in 1997.
Party authorities took other preventive measures as well. In 1991, 
they established an embryonic new bureaucracy to coordinate responses 
to social unrest and nip incipient protests in the bud.5 That same year, 
they launched a nationalistic “patriotic-education” campaign in schools 
and the media.6 During the 1990s, movies focusing on atrocities that 
Japan had committed in China during the 1930s and 1940s steadily mi-
grated to the center of the state-run entertainment industry. “Patriotic 
education” also spread to Tibet, which had experienced its own unrest 
in 1988. Party authorities sent cadres into Buddhist monasteries to press 
monks to publicly renounce the Dalai Lama.
Although fundamental political change was out, limited institutional 
reforms were not. Central authorities desired better means to cope with 
the mounting conflicts brought by rapid social change. Administrative-
ly, they sought new ways to monitor their local agents. Giving citizens 
limited powers—to challenge local officials in court, offer opinions 
through legislative channels, or choose village officials through grass-
roots elections—looked like a solution. The 1990s saw law and litiga-
tion become a new state mantra. Authorities professionalized the judi-
ciary and privatized the bar. In 1997, “rule according to law” became a 
core CCP slogan, enshrined in the constitution two years later.7 
Deng remained convinced that economic development was the key to 
modernizing China and avoiding the USSR’s fate. Overcoming resistance 
within the CCP, he reinvigorated market reforms in 1992. Labor markets 
were liberalized. State-run systems for allocating jobs and housing gradu-
ally dissolved. By the late 1990s, this culminated in the full privatization 
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of urban housing in China. As the economy boomed, college graduates 
were left to their own skill, luck, or connections to make their careers 
and fortunes. Instead of going to work in state-owned enterprises, many 
sought jobs in the now-recognized private sector, including the growing 
numbers of foreign firms seeking to do business in China. Party leaders 
stood ready to welcome the newly wealthy with open arms. By 2002, they 
had managed to turn communist orthodoxy on its head—redefining Party 
tenets to accept self-made billionaires into the CCP itself. Money and 
power thus fused into “red capitalism.”8 
In the 1990s, China was increasingly open to the outside world. Stu-
dents flocked to learn English in preparation for overseas study. Joining 
the World Trade Organization in 2001 meant that China, after decades 
of isolation, was about to reconnect with global commerce. “Linking up 
with the outside world” (yu guoji jiegui) and adapting Chinese practices 
to mesh with international norms became national obsessions. Global-
ization was a source of national pride and state legitimacy. 
Such sentiments infused a broader range of state policies. China 
spent vast sums on a crash expansion of higher education in the late 
1990s, seeking to create universities of global repute equal to Harvard 
or Oxford. Numerically, at least, the effects were dramatic. In just the 
short period from 1998 to 2000, the number of entering college students 
doubled to two million as classrooms and dormitories overflowed. The 
surging tide of students fed another trend—the explosion of the Internet. 
Growing numbers of students began using loosely controlled college 
online chat rooms to discuss a wide range of topics.
Offline, the 1990s saw a boom in civil society organizations. Some 
groups were religious; others worked for causes such as women’s rights, 
poverty alleviation, and the like. As Beijing steadily backed away from 
providing services under a socialist economic model, it left many health 
and development tasks to citizens. Voluntary organizations naturally 
sprang up to fill the void. Overseas influences played a role too. Interna-
tional events such as the 1995 UN World Conference on Women, held 
in Beijing, helped to raise the stature of Chinese domestic organizations, 
while overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, Christian churches, and inter-
national NGOs such as the Ford Foundation provided crucial financial 
assistance. 
The party-state remained wary. When activists used civil society 
channels to form political organizations (such as the China Democracy 
Party, founded in 1998), the regime crushed them. In 1999, Falun Gong 
members leveraged new online tools to help them stage a surprise dem-
onstration at CCP headquarters in Beijing, during which they peacefully 
appealed for official recognition of their spiritual movement. After a 
brief tactical pause, authorities responded by expanding the “stability-
maintenance” organs set up in 1991 and turning them against Falun 
Gong in a brutal eradication campaign.
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By the turn of the millennium, Chinese leaders appeared to have sur-
mounted the crises of the early 1990s. As Andrew Nathan noted in 2003, 
they had seemingly managed to institutionalize single-party political 
rule, fusing it with market capitalism and global trade networks to cre-
ate a “resilient authoritarian” regime that would carry forward into the 
twenty-first century.
Reform Stagnates, 2003–12
Beneath the surface, however, the reforms of the 1990s were creat-
ing new challenges for the regime. By the early twenty-first century, eco-
nomic shifts had given birth to a new range of institutional forces. In-
creasing commercialization meant that media outlets such as the Southern 
Weekend group were no longer simple extensions of the CCP propaganda 
apparatus. Now, they had to compete for readers and advertising. A gen-
eration of crusading and muckraking journalists arose. They began to test 
the limits of censorship, reporting aggressively on corruption and abuses 
of power by local officials throughout China. The burgeoning Internet 
supercharged these efforts as more and more citizens took to new media 
to voice complaints. Legal reforms led some judges and bureaucrats to 
suggest that it was time to give China’s written constitution real weight. 
Outside the circles of government, meanwhile, there emerged a cadre of 
public-interest lawyers—figures such as Teng Biao and Xu Zhiyong—
who were skilled at wielding media pressure and legal rhetoric to press for 
deeper institutional reforms.
In 2003, these trends reached their high-water mark. The beating death 
in police custody of Sun Zhigang, a young college graduate and inter-
nal migrant to booming Guangzhou (Canton), triggered an explosion of 
both online and offline outrage. Liberal legal activists quickly emerged 
as opinion leaders, articulating legal and constitutional deficiencies with 
the case. Faced with overwhelming social pressure, Beijing annulled the 
nationwide detention system under which Sun had been held.
China’s leaders began to take a hard look at their society. They saw 
similarities with conditions in the East European and Central Asian 
countries where “color revolutions” had toppled authoritarian regimes 
during the first half of the 2000s. Thus began a steadily escalating crack-
down aimed at reasserting official control where it had slipped. The Par-
ty’s leaders turned against many of its own late-twentieth-century legal 
reforms. Within the courts, new political campaigns reminded judges of 
the supremacy of CCP rule over the constitution and laws. Pressure on 
public lawyers escalated. Regular police visits came first, followed by 
denial of law licenses, closure of organizations such as the Open Con-
stitution Initiative (2009), and the arrests or lengthy disappearances of 
key activists.
Similar controls spread on the Internet as well. In 1987, the first email 
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from China to Germany had read: “Across the Great Wall, we can reach 
every corner of the world.” Two decades later, Beijing sought to prevent 
precisely that. State authorities steadily adapted their methods of cen-
soring print and television to the online world, strengthening systems 
for blocking and filtering information to the point where they became 
known as the “Great Firewall of China.” Rather than a total barrier, the 
Firewall aims to make certain information outside China so hard to ac-
cess that most Chinese citizens will give up looking for it. Within China, 
it attempts to induce self-censorship on the part of most users and Inter-
net providers. The regime sanctions those who refuse to cooperate. Such 
pressures led Google, which had entered China in 2005, to shutter its do-
mestic Chinese search engine five years later. More compliant domestic 
firms such as Baidu now dominate the mainland-Chinese search market.
Tighter controls produced an especially dire turn in Xinjiang and 
Tibet. Since the 1990s, repressive policies in both regions had fueled 
rising popular resentment. After 2000, Beijing’s development policies 
brought a tide of Han Chinese migrants to each area, but limited benefits 
for locals. Festering tensions exploded into violence in Tibet in 2008 
and Xinjiang a year later. Brutal ethnic riots wracked Urumqi, killing 
hundreds of residents, both Han and Uighurs alike. Authorities cracked 
down hard with mass arrests and extensive use of force.
By the early twenty-first century, economic reforms were filling 
China’s cities with the emblems of modern success: skyscrapers and 
Starbucks. State investment was steered into massive infrastructure and 
urban-development programs. But in stark contrast to the 1980s, the 
benefits of such development now flowed disproportionately to a much 
narrower elite—state companies and foreign investors—rather than to 
the populace at large. Credit policies increasingly disfavored rural entre-
preneurs. Township and village enterprises that had helped rural China 
to boom during the 1980s faltered. Many went bankrupt.
The impact of these changes rippled through all levels of society. 
In the early 1990s, the best and brightest of China’s college graduates 
had sought their fortunes in the private sector. By the 2000s, this had 
reversed. State employment offered more attractive possibilities for en-
riching oneself—if not through legitimate earnings, then through cor-
ruption. Applications to join the civil service surged through the cen-
tury’s early years.9 Shifts occurred among the working poor as well. 
With fewer jobs to be had in the countryside, rural residents flowed to 
the cities in search of work. The migrant population, which had hovered 
between 60 and 70 million in the early 1990s, surged to 137 million in 
2000, and 206 million a decade after that.10 In the cities, however, only 
established residents had access to urban social benefits—health, edu-
cation, and pensions. New migrants went without. Trends such as these 
fueled dramatically accelerating income inequality; by 2008, it reached 
levels found in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa.
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Chinese authorities were acutely aware of these problems. In 2007, 
Premier Wen Jiabao warned that China’s development path was “unsta-
ble, unbalanced, uncoordinated, and ultimately unsustainable.” And un-
der Hu Jintao, authorities took steps to improve the lot of the rural poor. 
Agricultural taxes were abolished, and rural health care expanded. Such 
measures helped to stem rising inequality but did little to address under-
lying imbalances, particularly the steadily expanding privileges of state-
owned enterprises. After a bout of reform in the 1990s, a silent counter-
revolution had occurred in which state-owned enterprises (SOEs) saw 
their financial and political privileges reconfirmed. By 2006, Beijing 
was openly promulgating policies to help state-owned “national cham-
pions” compete with the foreign firms that had arrived to do business in 
China during the reform period.
These economic shifts reflected a deeper political ossification. As 
Deng’s generation of leaders with roots in the 1949 communist revolu-
tion passed from the stage, political power diffused among a broader 
elite. Jiang was weaker than Deng, and Hu was weaker than Jiang. Chi-
nese politics increasingly resembled a feudal oligarchy. Top CCP figures 
controlled extensive networks of personal influence comprising loyal 
followers spread throughout middle- and lower-level posts. The fusion of 
money and power that had taken place since the 1990s meant that these 
networks sprawled across Party organs, SOEs, and private financial in-
stitutions. Such was the case with Zhou Yongkang, a Politburo Standing 
Committee member, and thus one of China’s top nine leaders between 
2007 and 2012. On paper, his official portfolio consisted of the massive 
security apparatus that had ballooned over the prior decade to deal with 
internal dissent. But his actual turf extended deep into the state energy 
sector and the Sichuan provincial administration as well. Such cliques 
defied the basic Leninist principle of centralized rule in a one-party state, 
facilitated rampant corruption, and stymied systematic reform by foster-
ing nests of resistance to increasingly weak central leaders. 
As China approached 2012, politics appeared frozen. With economic 
and institutional reform seemingly blocked by the twin forces of internal 
CCP politics and total resistance to political liberalization, the country 
appeared to be locked in a “trapped transition.”11
Reform Unwinds, 2012–15
Behind the scenes, however, things were beginning to break loose. 
The year 2012 marked the end of the clear line of succession set by Deng 
back in the early 1990s. Factional struggles intensified over who would 
be elevated to positions of power. Opportunistic politicians sought to 
catapult themselves to higher office. In the southwestern metropolis of 
Chongqing, local CCP secretary Bo Xilai attempted to turbocharge his 
efforts to obtain a seat on the Politburo Standing Committee. Break-
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ing with long-accepted political norms that emphasized low-key public 
personas for up-and-coming cadres, he aggressively cultivated a charis-
matic populist image during his tenure from 2007 to 2012. His signature 
tactics included mass rallies, a revival of Maoist “red” culture, and an 
intense campaign against “organized crime” that swept up criminal sus-
pects, legitimate businessfolk, and their lawyers alike.
China’s decades-long economic boom was ending. After averaging 
a phenomenal 10 percent a year between 1979 and 2010, the growth 
rate slipped to 7.7 percent by 2012 and continued to sink in following 
years. In part, China was experiencing the same structural and demo-
graphic transitions that other developing East Asian economies such as 
South Korea and Taiwan had gone through. But Beijing’s specific de-
velopment choices exacerbated problems. Since the late 1990s, state-led 
investments in roads, airports, and housing had loomed large as driv-
ers of economic growth. This reached manic proportions after the 2008 
world financial crisis. Seeking to jump-start a slowing economy, Beijing 
began a massive stimulus program that included building the world’s 
most extensive high-speed rail network almost overnight. Such policies 
helped to prop up growth in the short term, but at the cost of soaring 
public debt, anemic domestic consumption, and a threefold overdepen-
dence on China’s frothy real-estate market to act simultaneously as an 
engine of growth, a source of local-government revenue (via land sales), 
and a place to invest private wealth. When the housing bubble began 
deflating after its 2011–13 peak, the pain made itself felt throughout the 
Chinese economy.
It was amid this mounting economic and political stress that Xi Jin-
ping took power. Like Bo, he was a “princeling” with an impeccable 
revolutionary pedigree. Xi was born in 1953; his father had served 
with Mao. Xi had emerged as a compromise candidate, acceptable to 
the competing factions identified with Hu and Jiang. Yet once Xi had 
ensconced himself in China’s triad of top offices (general secretary of 
the CCP, president of the People’s Republic, and head of the Central 
Military Commission) in 2013, he quickly broke through the bonds of 
established patterns and norms and shook the political landscape.
Xi moved to solidify his position by taking down his rivals. First in 
line was Bo Xilai. Bo had fallen from grace when his wife was implicated 
in a sordid murder plot involving the 2011 death of a British businessman, 
after which Bo’s police chief had fled to the U.S. consulate in Chengdu 
in early 2012. Xi quickly weeded out officials loyal to Bo and placed Bo 
himself on trial for corruption and abuse of power in 2013. Such a move 
was not entirely unprecedented. Similar investigations had been used in 
the 1990s and 2000s to fell individual Politburo members whom Jiang 
and Hu had regarded as threats during their respective ascents to power.
What followed, however, was new. In 2013, Xi moved against his 
next target—former security czar Zhou Yongkang, who had apparently 
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dissented from the decision to purge Bo. In doing so, Xi broke with un-
written Party rules that exempted former and current Politburo Standing 
Committee members from prosecution. Xi’s decision radically upend-
ed conventions that had existed since 
the beginning of the reform period. 
The targeting of family members (in 
this case, Zhou’s sons) by investiga-
tors further intensified unease among 
members of the political elite. Wild ru-
mors began to proliferate as to which 
other former leaders might be next.
Xi coupled his efforts to solidify 
control with a tough campaign against 
graft. Run under opaque rules by the 
secretive CCP disciplinary appara-
tus, it was the severest such campaign 
since the reform era began. Week af-
ter week, lists of officials sacked or placed under investigation flowed 
forth. Xi thus shattered 1990s-era norms that had tolerated both the fu-
sion of money and politics and the unabashed displays of excess that re-
sulted. Once self-confident cadres began to grow palpably afraid. Sales 
of Prada handbags and the receipts of Macau gambling houses nose-
dived. China’s ultra-rich busied themselves with efforts to move their 
assets and families abroad, while midlevel bureaucrats hunkered down 
in fear that a wrong move would end their careers, or worse.
By late 2014, rumors began swirling that retired top leaders such as 
Hu and Jiang had warned Xi to curb his efforts. If indeed they had urged 
him to avoid tangling with too many of the elite patronage networks, 
there is little evidence that he has heeded their message. On the con-
trary, the early months of 2015 saw the anticorruption campaign sweep 
through top military ranks, claiming a former Central Military Commis-
sion vice-chairman and dozens of generals. Most recently, it has even 
begun to envelop Hu’s and Jiang’s own factional allies.
With both the bureaucracy and other top leaders cowed, Xi central-
ized his formal power. A galaxy of new internal Party leadership groups 
has taken shape in the areas of foreign affairs, economic reform, and 
Internet security. Their shared feature is Xi Jinping at the apex. The 
domestic-security apparatus that Zhou Yongkang and his predecessors 
had assiduously built has been folded into a new national-security com-
mission, chaired (unsurprisingly enough) by Xi. Such moves run con-
trary to internal CCP practices dating from the 1980s. Under these old 
customs, top Party officials had divided power among themselves, seek-
ing elite stability through a rough balance of power. Xi has overturned 
this, stamping himself as the most powerful Chinese leader since Deng, 
and perhaps since Mao. 
As of early 2015, central 
CCP organs had begun to 
speak of the need to “rec-
tify” higher education, 
purge “Western values” 
from textbooks, and redi-
rect art and architecture 
back toward traditional 
Chinese forms.
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During his rise, Xi has borrowed directly from the playbook of his 
fallen rival Bo Xilai. He has projected a populist image, aided by the star 
quality of his wife, a renowned folk singer. His confident, easy interac-
tions with the public have formed a sharp contrast with those of his pre-
decessor Hu Jintao, a wooden speaker given to stiff sloganeering. Xi has 
tapped into a real vein of support among citizens who are disgusted by 
official graft, and who love seeing the rich and powerful being brought 
to their knees by a strong leader who knows how to get things done.
Xi has built on this sentiment. His image-building has begun to give 
off the whiff of a personality cult, with aromatic notes steadily strength-
ening over time. His public appearances have received a level of televi-
sion coverage dwarfing that accorded to any other top official. Starting in 
2014, he has begun delivering an annual personal address to the nation. 
Popular adulation for “Papa Xi”—a nickname that began online and has 
now drifted into the state press—has become a noticeable phenomenon. 
After Xi’s surprise December 2013 visit to a Beijing dumpling restaurant 
to dine with ordinary customers, it became a pilgrimage site for tourists. 
By early 2015, art students at one Beijing college were sketching his por-
trait as part of their entrance examination. The 2015 edition of the annual 
Chinese New Year’s gala on state television—the world’s most-watched 
annual broadcast, with a viewership approaching eight-hundred-million 
people—featured singers crooning “I give you my heart” while scenes of 
Xi visiting citizens and troops flashed behind them. This is a long way 
from the low-key style of collective leadership that had prevailed since 
the end of the Cultural Revolution in the 1970s.
Playing the populist card has gone hand in hand with reinforcing 
hard-line policies launched under Hu Jintao. The crackdown on public-
interest lawyers has tightened. Social-media sites have been subjected 
to tighter controls. Even those used to a degree of immunity have found 
themselves targeted. Foreign businesses have been alarmed by stepped-
up corruption probes into pharmaceutical companies, dawn raids by 
antimonopoly regulators on firms ranging from Microsoft to Mercedes-
Benz, and proposed antiterror rules that would require foreign software 
companies to hand over their encryption keys. New civil society laws 
have tightened restrictions on foreign NGOs. As of early 2015, central 
CCP organs had begun to speak of the need to “rectify” higher educa-
tion, purge “Western values” from textbooks, and redirect art and archi-
tecture back toward traditional Chinese forms.
Such moves reflect a deeper shift. For decades, state ideology has 
remained in limbo—a matter of perfectly coiffed television anchors 
mouthing increasingly anachronistic Marxist slogans. Xi has deepened 
efforts to find a new basis for the legitimacy of single-party rule. This 
son of a Maoist revolutionary has pivoted back to the pre-Maoist past, 
making a pilgrimage to the hometown of Confucius, extolling tradition-
al Chinese culture, and embracing reformers from the time of the Qing 
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dynasty (1644–1912) who were once derided as “feudal” or “reaction-
ary.” Under Xi’s mantra of the “China Dream,” a new ethnonationalist 
narrative has been taking shape. Slowly, China has begun to turn away 
from the late twentieth century and its policies of cultural openness. In 
schools, the role of English in the national college-entrance test has been 
deemphasized. On television, risqué knockoffs of Western dating pro-
grams have been eclipsed by game shows that test contestants’ knowl-
edge of Chinese-language characters.
For many, the new emphasis on China’s own cultural roots has fed a 
welcome sense of national pride. But it has intensified tensions with those 
who do not fit the new state narrative. Unregistered Christians in Zhejiang 
Province, tacitly tolerated for decades, have been hit by a sweeping offi-
cial campaign of church demolitions. Relations between the vast Han Chi-
nese majority and ethnically distinct minority populations have worsened. 
In Tibet, continued state repression has produced a wave of self-immola-
tions by more than a hundred young people. In Xinjiang, state suppression 
of Uighur identity and the Muslim religion have fueled radicalization and 
a rising wave of domestic terrorism. In Hong Kong, increasing mainland 
influence and Beijing’s heavy-handed controls have stirred discontent 
among Cantonese-speaking citizens fearful about the fate of their distinc-
tive cultural and political identity, resulting in the 2014 Occupy Central 
movement—the largest protests anywhere in China since 1989.12
After the Reform Era
Political stability, ideological openness, and rapid economic growth 
were the hallmarks of China’s reform era. But they are ending. China is 
entering a new era, the age after reform.
This is not entirely bad. For some in China, it may mean a chance to 
address such reform-era excesses as rampant ecological damage, stark 
social inequality, and a cultural heritage badly damaged in the rush to 
modernize. Yet there is also a dark side.
What kept China stable during the reform era can be summed up in a 
single word: institutionalization. The last two decades of the twentieth 
century saw the rise of an increasingly steady set of norms in China to 
govern state and society alike:
• An increasingly norm-bound politics of elite succession;
• A depoliticization of the bureaucracy, marked by the decline of 
factional purges and the rise of meritocratic norms;
• Steady institutional differentiation, with top CCP leaders handling 
more clearly defined portfolios and SOEs responding to market 
pressures;
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• The emergence of bottom-up “input” institutions—local elections, 
administrative-law channels, and a partly commercialized media 
airing popular grievances—that gave citizens a limited political 
voice and helped to boost state legitimacy; 
• New channels that helped to give the rising new economic elite 
a sense of being invested in both China’s future as well as in the 
existing party-state; 
• An ideological stance open enough to welcome a broad range of 
domestic social constituencies and foreign institutional innova-
tions alike.13 
These all are now unwinding. Some—such as semicompetitive local 
elections or assertive domestic media outlets—quietly gave way over 
the past decade in the face of renewed state controls. Since Xi’s rise in 
2012, other norms have been broken more dramatically.
The reasons for the unwinding are twofold. First, Beijing has system-
atically undercut its own bottom-up reforms. Over the past two decades, 
a regular pattern has developed. Individual leaders sponsor reforms to 
address latent governance problems. Doors open. Citizens start to use 
them to participate politically. Villagers begin to organize around semi-
open elections. Public-interest lawyers explore new legal channels. 
Social media start to take shape as a forum in which citizens can air 
grievances. At that point, central Party authorities get nervous. They see 
shades of 1989 and step in to put a lid on things. Reforms are smothered, 
activists detained. For precisely this reason, China has remained locked 
in a one-step-forward, one-step-backward dance since the 1990s, with 
the Party regularly deinstitutionalizing everything outside its own walls.
Naturally, this is a problem for Chinese society. It robs social activ-
ists of the gradual evolutionary path toward becoming a moderate, insti-
tutionalized political force. But it is a problem for the rulers too. Absent 
any external checks, the semi-institutionalized nature of Party rule since 
the 1990s has fused with the fastest accumulation of wealth in human 
history to produce vested political and economic interests that are both 
highly corrupt and deeply resistant to change—the Chinese analogue of 
the K Street lobbyist–U.S. Congress nexus, but without even the shadow 
of elections, judicial oversight, or a free press as checks.
Now put yourself in Xi Jinping’s shoes. You know that China faces 
deep economic and social challenges. You sense that the Party itself has 
gone badly astray. Yet you lack any external institutions to rectify it. 
Nor is there an alternative political force—such as the organized opposi-
tion movements that emerged despite authoritarian rule in Taiwan and 
South Korea—that you might employ as a counterweight. (Not that you 
would even remotely entertain such a notion: The lessons of 1989 run 
too deep.) What would you do?
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Here we come to the second reason for the shifts noted above. Xi 
appears to have concluded that his only path to a breakthrough requires 
him to tear up the existing rules—reversing many if not all of the partly 
institutionalized internal Party norms that Andrew Nathan noted back in 
2003. Hence Xi has opted for politicized anticorruption purges of rivals, 
centralization of power in his own hands, cultivation of a populist im-
age, and an ideological turn toward nationalism and cultural identity. 
These are not mere transitory policies. For Xi, they are absolutely funda-
mental shifts necessary to address the crisis he sees facing China.
He may be right. Optimists can point to his efforts at fiscal and eco-
nomic reform. They can cite his efforts to strengthen Party disciplinary 
and legal systems as indications that he will build new political institu-
tions on the ashes of the old.14 Perhaps Xi does indeed belong to that 
rarest of all rare breeds—the benevolent authoritarian emperor who pre-
sides wisely over the remodeling of China, while ruthlessly crushing 
dissent in the process.
Moreover, there are still several key reform-era norms that have not 
yet been breached. The ideological redefinition of China remains em-
bryonic. Marxist dialectics still figure in CCP speeches even as Con-
fucian quotations proliferate. And Chinese state television, unlike its 
Russian counterpart, continues to promote interethnic harmony rather 
than rank appeals to majority-group chauvinism. Most important, Xi has 
drawn a clear line at social mobilization. For all of his invocation of 
Mao-era symbolism, there has been no sign that he intends to resort to 
mass movements.
Yet China is now steadily cannibalizing its own prior political insti-
tutionalization. Observers such as David Shambaugh, who once pointed 
to such institutionalization as a source of stability for the party-state, are 
revising their evaluations of the system’s sustainability sharply down-
ward.15 Others have begun to speculate openly whether reform-era poli-
cies limiting top Party leaders to ten years in office might be next to go, 
with Xi Jinping perhaps trying to extend his rule well beyond 2022.16 
Uncertainty hangs in the air. Chinese with the most to lose are diversify-
ing against risk—placing their money in Vancouver real estate and their 
children in U.S. colleges, and maybe even seeking passports from one or 
another of the small Caribbean nations that is known to put citizenship 
up for sale.
The events of 1989 did not resolve the core question of China’s politi-
cal future. Nor did they put it on hold indefinitely. Rather, they launched 
a cascading set of effects that have swept through China’s politics, econ-
omy, and society in the years since. The resulting reverberations have 
now begun to dislodge core elements of the institutional consensus that 
has governed China for decades. A new future is slouching toward Bei-
jing to be born. 
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